Last updated on July 7, 2013
(Note: This is the first of a two-part guest post by Catherine Herrold, a PhD candidate at Duke University whose dissertation looks at the relationship between philanthropic foundations and the Egyptian revolution. The second part will be posted on Wednesday morning.)
Over the long term I am optimistic for Egypt. But our transition will last at least 10 to 15 years. In the meantime I am pessimistic.
This was a common sentiment expressed by civil society leaders during the first year of Egypt’s democratic transition. From January 2010 through July 2012, I conducted 75 interviews with staff of Egyptian NGOs, Egyptian philanthropic foundations, and international donors operating in Egypt. All felt that civil society had an important role to play in advancing Egypt’s political transition in the wake of the January 25, 2011 revolution.
None, however, predicted that the transition would be swift. Rather, they all agreed that while the revolution was sudden, substantive transformation would take time. They also pointed out that while change at the top levels of political power was crucial, reform would only be complete when marginalized groups were able to fully claim their economic, social, and political rights.
#June30: One Entry in Egypt’s Evolving Democratic Dictionary
On June 30 of this year, the one-year anniversary of the election of Mohamed Morsi, Egypt’s first democratically elected president, millions of protestors poured into the streets to demand his ouster. After days of both pro- and anti-Morsi rallies, the military stepped in on July 3 and stripped the president of his powers. What we are witnessing with Morsi’s ouster is one of what will likely be many trials in Egypt’s prolonged experiment with democracy. Protestors and pundits alike are debating whether the military’s intervention to remove Morsi from power after days of massive uprisings was a “coup” or merely a second popular revolution. The answer to that question has important and immediate implications for both Egypt and the US, as American foreign policy stipulates that no foreign aid shall be disbursed to a military junta. But the larger questions in Egypt’s ongoing revolution are how Egyptians will define their own version of democracy, how they will go about achieving it, and how foreign actors can best support Egyptians in their quest.
Democracy Promotion in Egypt: Pages from Tattered Playbooks
To date, the US has made a number of miscalculations in its approach to Egypt’s political transition. From supporting Hosni Mubarak well into the January 25 uprisings to turning a blind eye to Mohamed Morsi’s usurpation of authoritarian powers, the US has sent the message that it values regional stability over Egyptian democracy. American aid to Egyptian civil society was also flawed. It reflected a fundamental misunderstanding of both the tenacity of remnants of the Mubarak regime and the nuanced way in which Egyptian civil society integrates political and economic development.
In the months following the January 25 uprisings, the US government expanded its democracy promotion aid budget from $15 million to $65 million and, despite Egyptian government objections, channeled the bulk of those funds directly to NGOs rather than through government ministries. Most of the grants went to international NGOs and foreign-funded Egyptian human rights organizations that were implementing projects aimed at fostering a Western-style liberal democracy. The focus was on elections, reform of government institutions, and the development of an independent, NGO-based civil society: all standard elements of most US democracy promotion programs.