02
Oct 12

Two New Papers on Political Power in Africa

First, a new working paper by Patrick Francois et al.:

This paper presents new evidence on the power sharing layout of national political elites in a panel of African countries, most of them autocracies. We present a model of coalition formation across ethnic groups and structurally estimate it employing data on the ethnicity of cabinet ministers since independence. As opposed to the view of a single ethnic elite monolithically controlling power, we show that African ruling coalitions are large and that political power is allocated proportionally to population shares across ethnic groups. This holds true even restricting the analysis to the subsample of the most powerful ministerial posts. We argue that the likelihood of revolutions from outsiders and the threat of coups from insiders are major forces explaining such allocations. Further, over-representation of the ruling ethnic group is quantitatively substantial, but not different from standard formateur premia in parliamentary democracies. We explore theoretically how proportional allocation for the elites of each group may still result in misallocations in the non-elite population.

The emphasis is mine, and in light of my one-observation sample — the 2009 coup d’état in Madagascar — I can’t say that I am surprised.

Second, a new working paper by Rainer and Trebbi:

The study of autocracies and weakly institutionalized countries is plagued by scarcity of information about the relative strength of different players within the political system. This paper presents novel data on the composition of government coalitions in a sample of fifteen post-colonial African countries suited to this task. We emphasize the role of the executive branch as the central fulcrum of all national political systems in our sample, especially relative to other institutional bodies such as the legislative assembly. Leveraging on the impressive body of work documenting the crucial role of ethnic fragmentation as a main driver of political and social friction in Africa, the paper further details the construction of ethnic composition measures for executive cabinets. We discuss how this novel source of information may help shed light on the inner workings of typically opaque African political elites.

Again, the emphasis is mine.


20
Sep 12

Organic Food: Confirmation Bias or Ambiguity Aversion?

A reader writes:

This might be interesting for you: people are annoyed/unhappy with NPR’s coverage about a report out of Stanford that said organic food isn’t really any healthier than conventional food. Clear case in point showing when people are faced with data and facts that counter their beliefs, they will more often than not completely shut it out and continue with their original belief. It’s much easier to continue believing what you thought before than stretch your mind and possibly acknowledge that you’re wrong or at least don’t have the full story. And we wonder why things don’t get accomplished?

What the reader has in mind is confirmation bias, the cognitive bias that makes people give more weight to empirical evidence that support their beliefs and less weight to empirical evidence that contradicts their beliefs, and about which I have written before in the context of development policy. Continue reading →


11
Sep 12

(Lack of) State Power in Africa, Again

Political evolution on the continent’s western side is often a series of eruptions: order appears to be established, and then the volcano explodes again. In Togo and Gabon, the levers of power have long seemed immutable, dominated by the same families for decades. In Guinea and Ivory Coast, both on the mend after years of upheaval, democratic order seemed to arrive at last only recently. But all of these nations bubble with uncertainty beneath the surface. Western donors and officials who visit the West African capitals to offer congratulations on stability — the new World Bank president was in Abidjan, the Ivorian commercial capital, last week — should be warned: their compliments may be premature.

Legitimacy, it turns out, is not conferred from the outside.

From an article by Adam Nossiter in last Sunday’s New York Times.

For me, the last sentence of the excerpt above sums it all up: the amount of outside recognition a regime enjoys is not a sufficient condition for state power.

A regime also needs its legitimacy to be recognized internally in order to be legitimate, and many (West) African regimes simply are not recognized internally as legitimate widely enough.

Thus, it is only when a regime enjoys both external and internal legitimacy that we can truly talk of state power. In the limit, it is probably the case that internal legitimacy can be a sufficient condition. But not external legitimacy.

Imagine what would happen if the US government were recognized by the governments of France, Germany, the United Kingdom, etc., but had little legitimacy within its own borders except in the areas around Washington, DC. Chances are whatever policies would be adopted in Washington would have little traction, say, in California or in Texas.

In a post on state power last week, I discussed how the point made above (and by Nossiter in his Times article) is made very well in Herbst’s States and Power in Africa. Another good reading on the topic is Crawford Young’s The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective.

Other books which seem interesting on the topic (but which I haven’t yet had a chance to read) are Besley and Persson’s (2011) Pillars of Prosperity (though note that there is a bit of microeconomic theory in there) and Migdal’s (1988) Strong Societies and Weak States.

That being said, I have not been trained as a political scientist, so I am not an expert on this literature. I hope a few political scientists will chime in with additional suggestions — in particular, suggestions for journal articles, which can be read more quickly than books.


10
Sep 12

Never Too LATE, Part 3: Observational Data

Last week I wrote two posts about the local average treatment effect (LATE). Click here for part 1, and here for part 2, in which I respectively discuss the difference between the ATE and the LATE, and the difficulty of comparing results across studies if different studies rely on different instrumental variables (IV).

This brings me to the topic of this post. After I posted part 2 last week, a reader — an economist who has been out of school for some time — emailed me with the following:

I can’t recall learning about this while in grad school. Surely it was mentioned and it’s just receded into a dark corner of my memory? It seems like a pretty important concept to consider, although I guess it’s a bigger concern for experimental economics?

The emphasis is mine. An equally emphatic answer would be: “No, it’s actually a huge problem with nonexperimental data.”

Wages, Education, and the Vietnam War

To see this, consider the classic IV example — Angrist’s (1990) study of the impact of education on wages. Because wages and education are jointly determined — if anything, there is reverse causality because people choose to go to spend time in school based on the expectation of a higher wage — Angrist used a respondent’s Vietnam draft lottery number as an IV for the respondent’s education. Continue reading →


06
Sep 12

Never Too LATE, Part 2

I began this discussion on Tuesday with an example in order to define the concept of local average treatment effect (LATE).

In the words of Imbens and Wooldridge (2007), LATEs are ”average effects for subpopulations that are induced by the instrument to change the value of the endogenous regressors.”

What prompted my wanting to write about LATE is a post on Tom Pepinsky’s blog, where Tom discusses the frequent lack of discussion of local average treatment effects (LATEs) in the political science literature: Continue reading →