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Category: Economics

Yours Truly in the Pacific Standard

Nobody likes America’s agricultural policy. Not conservatives, not liberals, and not policy experts, who frequently use terms like “astonishingly irrational” to describe our system of federal subsidies for farming. So why is everyone so angry and shocked that last week’s laden farm bill—comprised of addendums to the same legislative package that Congress has been tagging since 1938—failed in the House of Representatives? Some reports describe a Farm Lobby Goliath smited by a tiny contingent of conservative House GOPers who are hellbent on shrinking the size of government no matter the objections of their fellow Republicans from farm country. But according to a new working paper by Duke economic policy researchers Marc Bellemare and Nick Carnes, it might not have been the all-powerful farm lobby that the House GOP subverted so much as a small contingent of American voters.

From an article by Michael Fitzgerald discussing my most recent working paper in the Pacific Standard, formerly known as Miller-McCune Magazine.

That said, although we find that electoral incentives seem to be the most consistent driver of congressional voting behavior on matters of agricultural protection, we still find evidence that lobbying (via the amount of contributions members of Congress receive from agricultural political action committees) and legislator preferences (via how much of their pre-Congress career the same members of Congress have spent working in agriculture) matter.

On Plagiarism

On May 24, I published a post titled “Can Urban Agriculture Help with Food Security?,” in which I discussed the conclusions of a new working paper I had discovered through RepEc’s mailing list for new working papers in agricultural economics.

Last week Alberto Zezza, with whom I had corresponded about other things in the past, wrote to me to let me know that the paper I had linked to on May 24 appeared to have plagiarized one of his own published articles. Here is the abstract of Alberto and his coauthor’s article, which was published in Food Policy in 2010:

The Political Economy of Agricultural Policy

Hot on the heels of Monday’s post, in which I discussed my latest working paper “Why Do Members of Congress Support Agricultural Protection?,” here is the abstract of a very nice new article (a link to an ungated working paper version can be found here) by Kym Anderson, Gordon Rausser, and Jo Swinnen in the latest issue of the Journal of Economic Literature:

The agricultural and food sector is an ideal case for investigating the political economy of public policies. Many of the policy developments in this sector since the 1950s have been sudden and transformational, while others have been gradual but persistent. This article reviews and synthesizes the literature on trends and fluctuations in market distortions and the political-economy explanations that have been advanced. Based on a rich global data set covering a half-century of evidence on commodities, countries, and policy instruments, we identify hypotheses that have been explored in the literature on the extent of market distortions and the conditions under which reform may be feasible.