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Category: Economics

More on Admitting Failure and Corporate Social Responsibility

Back in October, I wrote a long post about the seeming trend toward admitting failure (and learning from failure) among nonprofits. In that post, I made the point that admitting failure was the not-for-profit world equivalent of corporate social responsibility in the for-profit world.

The post generated quite a bit of buzz, and Valerie Bauman, a Seattle-based reporter, got in touch with me to discuss the idea of nonprofits admitting failure — and its relationship with corporate social responsibility.

Here is an excerpt from the article Valerie wrote at the time for the Puget Sound Business Journal:

Marc Bellemare, a development economist who teaches public policy and economics at Duke University, views admitting failure as a public relations move to enhance credibility and reputation, similar to touting corporate social responsibility efforts in the for-profit world.

“When I started hearing about admitting failure, it is very nice, but there’s nothing that prevents you from learning from your own failures without having to admit them,” Bellemare said. “For me, it really is a marketing tool more than anything.”

However, he said the move toward disclosure could eventually have a positive effect overall, when it reaches a tipping point and every nonprofit has to be more forthcoming about failure.

“We may soon be moving toward a new equilibrium where everyone has to admit failure, and say ‘where did we go wrong?'” Bellemare said. “Everyone has to look contrite in a way — or else they start looking suspicious.”

Still, disclosing the failure of a project or cost overruns is less scary for nonprofits than disclosing financial mismanagement or fraud, Bellemare said.

“That’s a whole different ball game,” he said. “I think it’s much more likely to scare away donors than failure of projects.”

My Work on Food Prices Discussed in Sweden’s Axess Magasin

A study by Marc F. Bellemare (2011) studies the link between food prices and food-related protests and riots. The study uses the amount of news about food riots as a measure of how widespread protests are and relates these to monthly data on food prices. This creates a relatively short time periods (months rather than years), which increases the accuracy of the relationship. Indeed, if one studies the relationship betweenthe protests in the Middle East that began in January and February with annual data, one would have missed the fact that that they were preceded by very large price increases starting in the fall of 2010. To identify a causal relationship, the study uses natural disasters to explain variation in food prices. Interestingly, the results of this study show that rising food prices lead to increased risk of protests, but that the effect is reverse for food price volatility.

This is from an article in in Sweden’s Axess Magasin by Jesper Roine, of the Stockholm School of Economics.

The original article is in Swedish — the above excerpt is brought to you in part by Google Translate. From the Wiki page for Axess Magasin, I conclude that it’s Sweden’s equivalent of The Atlantic.

The Long-Run Effects of the Scramble for Africa

That’s the title of a new working paper by Stelious Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou:

We examine the long-run consequences of the scramble for Africa among European powers in the late 19th century and uncover the following empirical regularities. First, using information on the spatial distribution of African ethnicities before colonization, we show that borders were arbitrarily drawn. Apart from the land mass and water area of an ethnicity’s historical homeland, no other geographic, ecological, historical, and ethnic-specific traits predict which ethnic groups have been partitioned by the national border. Second, using data on the location of civil conflicts after independence, we show that partitioned ethnic groups have suffered significantly more warfare; moreover, partitioned ethnicities have experienced more prolonged and more devastating civil wars. Third, we identify sizeable spillovers; civil conflict spreads from the homeland of partitioned ethnicities to nearby ethnic regions. These results are robust to a rich set of controls at a fine level and the inclusion of country fixed effects and ethnic-family fixed effects. The uncovered evidence thus identifies a sizable causal impact of the scramble for Africa on warfare.