This is the title of a new paper in Economic Development and Cultural Change by Jean-Marie Baland, Catherine Guirkinger, and Charlotte Mali. Because EDCC does not publish abstracts, here is the abstract of a previous version:
“From field observations of credit cooperatives in Cameroon, we find that a substantial number of members take loans that are fully collateralized by savings they held in the same institutions. 20% of the loans observed fall into this category. The price paid in terms of net interest payments is not negligible as it represents 13% of the amount borrowed. As traditional arguments such as credit rating or time inconsistent preferences cannot explain such behavior in our specific setting, we propose a new rationale based on in-depth interviews with members of the cooperatives. Those interviews indicate that some members systematically use credit as a way to pretend that they are too poor to have available savings. By doing so, they can successfully oppose request for financial help from friends and relatives. We develop a signaling model to analyze the conditions under which this behavior is an equilibrium outcome.”