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Marc F. Bellemare Posts

The Mote and the Beam: Context-Dependent Policy Making?

The Parable of the Mote and the Beam, Domenico Fetti, c. 1619 (Source: Wikimedia Commons)

Every paradigm is informed by its contemporary society, even if they seem unrelated.  The go-to example of this is Freud’s theories, from which we derive “pent up” and “release” and “drives” and “pressures” – all of which are the language of the turn-of-the century steam industrial world.  Whether Freud was right or not isn’t the point– he just sounds wrong because we don’t use steam engines and the brain doesn’t look like an engine anymore.

The point here is that we acknowledge the ideas of prior cultures relied on their context, but we willfully ignore our own immersion in our context.  I [The Last Psychiatrist] read this in The Economist:

However, unlike Freud’s unconscious (a hot, claustrophobic place full of repressed memories and inappropriate sexual fantasies about one’s parents) the modern unconscious is a place of super-fast data processing, useful survival mechanisms and rules of thumb about the world that have been honed by millions of years of evolution. It is the unconscious, for instance, that stitches together data on colour, shape, movement…

Note that this isn’t merely a metaphor or analogy to modern computers – it is an earnest but uncritical assumption of an actual similarity.

More here from The Last Psychiatrist.

What I think is particularly interesting here is how different frames of reference (e.g., the steam engine, the computer) not only lead to different ways of describing the same thing, but perhaps to different actions in response to the same problem.

Does one settle upon different policy prescriptions depending on whether one sees the government as a steam engine or as a computer?

I have discussed time and again on this blog (and in public lectures) the difficulty of truly knowing anything in the social sciences, and the usefulness of controlled experiments in chipping away at our ignorance.

But the question I ask above is, I’m afraid, unanswerable. There appears to be such a thing as context-dependent memory (the “improved recall of specific episodes or information when the context present at encoding and retrieval are the same,” or the reason why if you study drunk, you should also take the test drunk), but context-dependent policy making goes beyond that.

Put another way: Would we care so much about social capital, network effects, and spillovers if the Internet had never been invented?

On steam engines and computers, I was reminded of William Gibson and Bruce Stirling’s The Difference Engine, about which Amazon say:

1855: The Industrial Revolution is in full and inexorable swing, powered by steam-driven cybernetic Engines.  Charles Babbage perfects his Analytical Engine and the computer age arrives a century ahead of its time.  And three extraordinary characters race toward a rendezvous with history—and the future.

The book is thought to have popularized the whole Steampunk aesthetic. I read it in college and didn’t enjoy it half as much as I did Gibson’s Sprawl Trilogy, but your mileage may vary.

Truth in Advertising, Game Theory Edition

Q: Looking at the flipside, was there ever a situation in which you were pleasantly surprised at what game theory was able to deliver?

A: None. Not only none, but my point would be that categorically game theory cannot do it. Maybe somewhere in a Sherlock Holmes or Agatha Christie story there was a situation where the detective was very clever and he applied some logical trick that somehow caught the criminal, something like that. You know in America there was a programme on CBS, called Numbers, written Numb3rs, with the ‘e’ reversed. Numb3rs wanted to make people curious about mathematics through detective stories. I happened to hear about it because I had done some experimental work with Amos Tversky and Dana Heller, about the game of hide and seek. In one of the episodes they refer to the paper. Of course it was a joke, but the fact that my name was mentioned in such a programme made me very happy. But outside such programmes, I categorically cannot see any case where game theory could be helpful.

That’s from The Browser’s FiveBooks interview with Tel Aviv University’s Ariel Rubinstein, one of the world’s most prominent game theorists.

We used the textbook Rubinstein wrote with Martin Osborne in the second-semester microeconomic theory course I took during the first year of my Ph.D.

I really enjoyed going through the material (especially in contrast with the second half of the course, on general equilibrium theory). Since then, however, I have been struck time and again by the limited applicability of game theory. It’s interesting that one of the world’s leading game theorists is forthcoming about that lack of applicability.

 

Which Came First? Chicken, Eggs, and Causality

This is your brain on causality.

From an old albeit still relevant (and funny) American Journal of Agricultural Economics article (link opens a .pdf) by Wally Thurman and Mark Fisher:

The notion of Granger causality is simple: If lagged values of X help predict current values of both X and Y, then X is said to Granger cause Y. We implement this notion by regressing eggs on lagged eggs and lagged chickens; if the coefficients on lagged chickens are significant as a group, then chickens cause eggs. A symmetric regression tests the reverse causality. We perform the Granger causality tests using one to four lags. The number of lags in each equation is the same for eggs and chickens.

To conclude that one of the two “came first,” we must find unidirectional causality from one to the other. The test results indicate a clear rejection of the hypothesis that eggs do not Granger cause chickens. They provide no such rejection of the hypothesis that chickens do not Granger cause eggs. Therefore, we conclude that the egg came first.

What I like about Thurman and Fisher’s paper is that it neatly illustrates the point that for all the media talk of causality surrounding Christopher Sims’ work on Granger causation when he and Thomas Sargent won the Nobel prize for economics last year, Granger causation is not the same as actual causation.

(HT: Jeremy Petranka.)