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Category: Agriculture

Who Wins and Who Loses During Food Crises?

In a very good article in the latest issue of Science, Jo Swinnen and one of his coauthors explain that, as with many other changes in economic circumstances, rising food prices are a boon to some people and a bane to others. Here is the summary:

Spikes in food prices have pushed food security to the top of the global policy agenda. Price increases have mixed effects on poverty and hunger: They increase the cost of food for consumers but increase incomes of farmers, who represent the bulk of the world’s poor. Net effects will differ depending on whether poor households or countries buy or import, or sell or export food (infrastructure, institutions, and market imperfections will play roles, as well). Policies to influence prices imply winners and losers, not just between rich and poor, but also among the poor. These nuances are too often absent in public debate, to the detriment of policy-making. Moreover, the arguments put forward today, that high food prices generally hurt the poor, are in contrast with those put forward a few years ago, that low food prices were hurting the poor.

Put simply, when food prices rise, food producers benefit and food consumers lose out. But while the media used to causally link low food prices to poverty and hunger, it was high food prices instead that were blamed for poverty and hunger during the food crises of 2008 and of 2010-2011.

Does Participation in Agricultural Value Chains Make Smallholders Better Off?

Yes, it does.

At least, that is my answer to the question in a new article of mine titled “As You Sow, So Shall You Reap: The Welfare Impacts of Contract Farming,” which is forthcoming in World Development.

More specifically, I try to estimate the causal impacts of participation in contract farming — the economic institution in which a processing firm contracts its production of agricultural commodities out to grower households, or the first link in an agricultural value chain — on the welfare of the smallholders.

The major difficulty with studying such problems is that households are not randomly assigned to the treatment (i.e., participants in contract farming) and control (i.e., nonparticipants in contract farming) groups.

The smallholders who choose to participate in agricultural value chains do so following systematic patterns. The problem is that the researcher has no idea what those patterns are, as they often involve variables that are unobserved.

For example, it could be that more entrepreneurial smallholders are less likely to participate in agricultural value chains because they have better options. Or it could be that smallholders who are risk-averse are more likely to participate in agricultural value chains because contract farming partially insures them against income risk. But if it is difficult to measure risk aversion, it is even more difficult to measure entrepreneurial ability.

Insecure Land Rights, Land Tenancy, and Sharecropping

Lac Alaotra, the "Rice Bowl" of Madagascar.

My job-market paper — for nonacademics, that’s the paper I presented when giving recruitment seminars when I was on the job market back in 2006 — is finally published.

From the latest issue of Land Economics:

Most studies of tenurial insecurity focus on its effects on investment. This paper studies the hitherto unexplored relationship between tenurial insecurity and land tenancy contracts. Based on distinct features of formal law and customary rights in Madagascar, this paper augments the canonical model of sharecropping by making the strength of the landlord’s property right increasing in the amount of risk she bears within the contract. Using data on landlords’ subjective perceptions in rural Madagascar, empirical tests support the hypothesis that insecure property rights drive contract choice but offer little support in favor of the canonical risk sharing hypothesis.

After working on this on and off for almost ten years, I am glad to finally see this article in print.